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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
Security Storage and Trust Co. v. Martin (Md., 1924), 125 A. 449;
and Harland v. Pe Ell State Bank (1922), 122 Wash. 289, 210 P. 681.
Of some interest is the case of Young v. First. Nat. Bank of Oneida
(1924), 150 Tenn. 451, 265 S. W. 681, where it was held that proof
that a country bank, which did not represent or advertise that its safe
deposit boxes were burglar proof, did not employ a night watchman,
only kept the electric lights burning in the bank until approximately
11:00 p. m., did not equip the building with a burglar alarm, and depos-
ited its own securities in a screw door steel safe, did not show lack of
ordinary care to protect the plaintiff's bonds deposited in a safe deposit
box from burglary. The matter may well be summed up in the words
of St. Sure, J., in the case of Webber v. Bank of Tracy (1924), 66
Cal. App. 29, 225 P. 41, where he said: "In the absence of any stipu-
lation between the parties, the limit of a bailee's obligation is the exer-
cise of ordinary care, and he cannot be said to be an insurer of the
property against theft, if he has exercised such care. * * * * It
would seem that the ordinary care required of a bank in a case like this
is that the construction of the bank building and the methods of pro-
tection and the general conduct of its business should conform to those
of banks in similar communities." It was then held that the bank's
negligence in caring for the contents of safe deposit boxes in the bur-
glarized vault was not inferable from its failure to keep them behind
the stronger door of the vault, where the bank was accustomed to use
the same boxes for its own money and bonds. It was further held
that a country bank conforming to the practice of all other such banks
in the state of like population and character in maintaining safe de-
posit vaults in a building as good or better than the ordinary country
bank building with the usual interior arrangement, and protecting the
vault by doors similar to those of other such banks in similar sized
communities, was not liable for the loss of the contents of safe deposit
boxes by burglary, though it had neither a night watchman nor a bur-
glar alarm, which no such bank in the state had up to the time of the
burglary. J. T. B., '26.
CONTEMPT OF COURT-BILL OF EXCEPTIONS-INTENT.
-United States v. Ford, 9 Fed. (2d) 990 (1925).
Defendant, an attorney, in a trial in which he was of counsel, filed
a bill of exceptions containing 55 exceptions of which 27 were untrue
in fact. One of his assignments of error was that the trial court erred
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in denying his motion for a directed verdict. In fact no such motion
was made. The bill of exceptions and assignments of error were drawn
up for defendant by another person, and defendant disclaimed any
knowledge of them until they were called to his attention by the oppos-
ing counsel, whereupon he struck out the untrue statements. He also
disclaimed any knowledge of how the false exceptions had come into
the bill, and any intent to deceive the court. But he made no attempt
to explain the presence of the statements, and did not positively deny
having dictated them. Held, the filing of such false bill of exceptions
and assignments of error was punishable as a contempt of court.
Though the language of the court indicated a strong suspicion that the
act was willful, it further held that the absence of actual knowledge
of the contents of documents which counsel presents to the court, and
of malicious intent, is no defense, but only an extenuating circumstance
going to mitigate the punishment.
It is a well established principle that it is the act, not the intent,
which constitutes a contempt, and that absence of malice at most miti-
gates the penalty. The following cases illustrate this principle; but
in each case the nature of the particular act constituting the contempt
has some bearing on the question, as it is easier to imply the intent
from the act in some cases than in others. In re Braun, 259 F. 309
(disobedience to court order); Wilcox Silver Plate Co. v. Schimmel
et al., 59 Mich. 524, 26 N. W. 692 (disobeying injunction); Barber
v. George P. Jones Shoe Co., 120 A. 80 (N. H.) (disregard of oral
agreement with opposing counsel and court order to put it into writ-
ten motion); Kneisel et al. v. Ursus Motor Co., People v Gilmore,
316 Ill. 336, 147 N. E. 243 (filing petition without leave of court);
Wartman v. Wartman, Taney 362, Fed. Cas. No. 17, 210 (parting with
trust fund pending disposition by court); Terry et al. v. State, 77
Neb. 612, 110 N. W. 733 (repeating application for habeas corpus
after another has been refused on the same facts) ; Levinstein v. E. I.
Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 258 F. 662 (refusing to testify) ; State v.
Kaiser, 25 N. M. 245, 181 P. 278 (bribery and intimidation of wit-
ness) ; McDougall v. Sheridan et al., 23 Idaho 191, 128 P. 954 (publi-
cation attacking integrity of court) ; People v. Wilson, 64 Ill. 195, 16
Am. Rep. 528 (semble) ; State v. Howell, 80 Conn. 668, 69 A. 1057
(publication tending to obstruct the administration of justice) ; In re
Chartz, 29 Nev. 110, 85 P. 352, 124 A. S. R. 915, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.)
916 (charges of corruption against court); Coons v. State, 191 Ind.
580, 134 N. E. 194 (accusations against judge by grand jury in its re-
port) ; Dodge v. State, 140 Ind. 284, 39 N. E. 745 (insulting language
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol11/iss4/9
COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
of counsel toward court); United States v. Anonymous, 21 F. 761
(interrupting examination of witness). In re P., 83 N. J. Eq. 390, 91
A. 326 (see below) ; State v. Finley, 30 Fla. 325, 11 So. 674, 18 L. R.
A. 401 (see below). A few old cases are contra. Bond v. Bond. 69
N. C. 97 (disobedience to court order) ; Wells v. Commonwealth, 21
Grat. (Va.) 500 (attorney in good faith aiding in obstructing decree
of court); Lightfoot & Flanders v. Freeman, 54 Ga. 215 (sheriff in
good faith committing breach of duty involving decision of a difficult
point of law) ; and the following cases of publishing contemptuous arti-
cles without wrongful intent: Ex parte Biggs, 64 1%. C. 202; In re
Moore et al., 63 N. C. 397; In re Walker, 82 N. C. 95; Buck v. Buck,
60 Ill. 105 (but see People v. Wilson, supra). An interesting group of
decisions are those holding that publications alleged to be contemptu-
ous, if capable of an innocent interpretation, are contemptuous only if
the intent is malicious, but if they allow of only one construction, the
intent is to be conclusively presumed from the act of publication. In
re Wooley, 11 Bush (Ky.) 111; Fishback v. State, 131 Ind. 304, 30
N. E. 1088; In re Chadwick, 109 Mich. 588, 67 N. W. 1071 ; In re Fite,
11 Ga. App. 665, 76 S. E. 397. In re Hickey, 258 S. W. 417 (Tenn.,
1924) deserves special mention because of its recency. It holds that
an article charging a judge with incompetency is not a contempt, if it
does not relate to a pending suit nor attack the judge's integrity, and
no intent to attack his integrity is proved.
The cases most nearly resembling the instant case in their facts
are those holding the following acts to be contemptuous: addition of
immaterial words by an attorney to a decree of court after it has been
signed (State v. Finley, supra, holding said act no ground for disbar-
ment in absence of malice, but contemptuous) ; insertion by solicitor
in chancery in decree of Vice-Chancellor, before he has signed it and
without his knowledge, words which the solicitor thought had been
unintentionally struck out (In re P., supra, also holding it no ground
for a disbarment, though a contempt) ; knowingly interposing a false
answer in a case (In re Hall, 85 Hun 620, decision in case not report-
ed) ; submission by coroner to court of bill for services at inquest,
containing false statements of fact (Ex parte Toepel, 139 Mich. 85,
102 N. W. 369) ; false statement by attorney of purpose for which evi-
dence is introduced (Goodhart v. State, 84 Conn. 60, 78 A. 853) ; ante-
dating filing of a paper by clerk of court, and inducing him to do so
by attorney (Howard v. Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co., 135 S. W. 707 (Tex.
Cv. A.), holding the acts grounds as well for removal from office and
disbarment, respectively). In the case of In re Jones, 103 Cal. 397,
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37 P. 385, an attorney was penalized as for a contempt for what was
in effect a false statement of law, rather than of fact, in presenting
an affidavit for change of venue on tie ground of partiality of the
judge, where the statute did not authorize a change of venue on that
ground. F. W. F., '27.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS-DIVORCE - VOLUNTARY SEPA-
RATION.-Stitterson v. Stitterson, 131 S. E. 641, March 3, 1926.
This case arose in North Carolina under a statute providing for
the allowance of absolute divorce by either party upon showing of
(1) a separation lasting over a period of five years and (2) residence
by the plaintiff within the state during that period. Mrs. Stitterson
asked for a divorce under this statute, her husband having been sen-
tenced to the penitentiary for twenty years and having been in prison
for more than five years preceding the bringing of the action. North
Carolina does not allow divorce for a felony Committed by the other
party so that Mrs. Stitterson's right to divorce depended entirely upon
the statute. All these facts as stated and the plaintiff's required resi-
dence were proved. The- court held that the statute was not intended
to cover cases of "involuntary" separation; that, while the husband's
commission of the crime was certainly voluntary, yet the sentencing
of the husband was involuntary "and since this was the direct cause
of the separation, the separation must be deemed involuntary; that
therefore Mrs. Stitterson was not entitled to a divorce under and by
virtue of the statute.
Several other states (Kentucky, Wisconsin, Rhode Island, and
Louisiana) have statutes of a like nature. One of the statutes states
that the separation must be voluntary. In the other states it has been
decided by judicial decision that the separation must be voluniary
whether it is so provided by the statute or not. Ferguson v. Ferguson,
8 Ky. L. Rep. 428; Thompson v. Thompson, 53 Wis. 153. In Rhode
Island there has been no decision, to my knowledge, under the statute.
All of the courts have been very strict in construing these statutes,
prehaps because all* divorce statutes are in derogation of the common
law. McDougal v. McDougal, 5 Wash. 802: Olson v. Olson. 28 Pa.
Super. Ct. 128. Whatever the cause, the result has been that all courts
have decided that the separation must be voluntary and that whenever
possible the courts have decided disputed facts to indicate an involun-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol11/iss4/9
